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AUTH CS, USAF

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MEMORANDUM FOR LT. GENERAL HOYSTEAD

SUBJECT: Targets for Strategic Air Attack in Red China

1. The problem is to recommend targets in Red China for strategic air attack by F.E.A.F.

2. Estimated forces available total five groups of B-29's. Informal estimate by Operations Analysis is that such a force could put 8,500 tons of bombs over targets per month. A C.E.P. of 1,500 feet is assumed.

3. An analysis of the transportation system of China demonstrates that effective disruption of rail traffic from the U.S.S.R. to China, or from China to North Korea, greatly exceeds the capabilities of the force available to F.E.A.F.

4. An analysis of possible war supporting target systems in China, including steel, petroleum, aircraft industry, armament plants, shipbuilding, and munitions, has shown that the only one of any promise is petroleum.

5. The petroleum target system is largely composed of storage areas around the major port cities because China's petroleum requirements are met essentially by imports of refined products by tanker from non-communist areas. There are three relatively small, widely dispersed petroleum refineries in Red China. The petroleum target system would include mining the ports which have significant storage facilities, the destruction of these storage facilities, and the destruction of the refineries. The initial cost of all these attacks on an estimated 57 targets in combination, is estimated at 8,000 tons. Restrack requirements would be very small. The effect of destruction of these targets would be to deny the use of petroleum products on hand, and to prevent the import of additional petroleum products except over a long, costly rail haul from the U.S.S.R. This would be a significant additional drain on the tight petroleum resources of the U.S.S.R.

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Memo for Lt. Gen. Norstad, subj: Targets for Strategic Air Attack in Red China, dtd 14 Aug 50

6. The target system recommended for second priority consists of aircraft concentrations. There are 365 airfields in Communist China, of which 50 are of prime importance. Reconnaissance would be required to reveal the locations of concentrations of fighters, bombers, or transports. Total weapon requirements cannot be estimated at this time; an average airfield attack would require about 655 tons. Most Chinese airfields are within 250 miles of the coast. The effect of the attack on selected airfields would be to blunt the capability of the Red Chinese Air Force to support their armies, to defend against attacks by U.N. bombers, and to deliver air attacks on U.N. forces in the Far East.

7. The third target system consists of marshaling yards in Manchuria through which all rail traffic coming into China from the U.S.S.R. must pass. There are three classification yards near the south border and twelve marshaling yards in the rest of Manchuria. The force requirements to disrupt rail movement in these areas (by attacks on all yards) would be about 10,000 tons per month. The effect of such attacks would be to reduce and disrupt the orderly movement of Soviet war supplies in support of the Chinese Communist forces. The F.E.A.F. forces available will not permit the marshaling yard attacks to be carried out completely, but most of the yards could be regularly attacked after the petroleum target system had been disposed of.

8. A final type of target against which F.E.A.F. long range bombers could be employed profitably would be concentrations of invasion craft in the major ports adjacent to Formosa. When reconnaissance revealed such build-ups, highest priority should be given this type of target. At present, concentrations are known to exist in Shanghai, Amoy, and Foochow.

9. The vulnerability of Communist China to air attack on urban areas has not yet been sufficiently analyzed. Initial consideration of this possible target system appeared to rule it out because of the very high weapon requirements involved. Other than the targets discussed above, no targets can as yet be presented whose destruction would result in a net "retaliatory" advantage.

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